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A F erninist Social Justice
Approach to Reproduction-Assisting
Technologies: A Case Study on the
Limits of Liberal rfheory*
BY JOAN C. CALLAHAN**
AND DOROTHY E. ROBERTS***
INTRODUCTION

I

n recent years, child welfare agencies in the Uni ted States have
seized thousands of infants who have been exposed prenatally to
various illicit drugs.' A number of these seizures have resulted in the

* Portions of this Article have been adapted with permission from Joan C.
Callahan, The Contract Motherhood Debate, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 82 (1993);
Joan C. Callahan & Patricia Smith, Liberalism. Communirarianisnt, and
Femimsm, in LIBERALISM AND COMMUN ITY (Noel Reynolds el al. eds.,
forthcomjng); Joan C. Callahan, Professions, Institutions, and Moral Risk, in
D ANIEL E. WU ESTE, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 243
( 1994); Feminism and Reprod11ctive Technologies, 5 J. CLII'\!C.A.L ETHICS 75
( 1994); Editor's Introduction: Reproduction. Ethics. and the Law: Feminist
Perspectives ,in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMII': IST PERSPECTI VES
I (Joan C. Callahan ed .. 1995); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104
HARV. L. REv. 141 9 ( 1991); Dorothy E. Robcns, Social Justice, Procreative
Liberty, and the Limits of Liberal Theo1:v: Robertson's Children of Choice, 20
L. & SOC. INQUIRY I005 ( 1995). Special thanks to Pat Smith for permission to
adapt material here from her paper wah Joan Callahan.
** Professor of Philosophy, Uni versity ':)fKcntucky. Ph.D. 1982, University
of Maryland.
*** Professor of Law. Rutgers University. B.A. 1977, Yale College; J.D.
1980, Harvard Law School.
1
See, e.g., Janet Gallagher, Collective B<"ld Fctith and Protecting the Fetus,
in REPRODUCTION, ETII ICS, AND THE L AW: FEMIN IST PERSPECTIVES 343 (Joan
C. Callahan ed., ! 995); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts 'YVho Have
Babies: Women ofColor, Equality, and the Right ofPrivacy, 104 HARV. L. REV.
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prosecution of women for drug use during pregnancy as a form of child
abuse. 2 Despite the fact that drug use during pregnancy seems to be
equally prevalent among women of all races in the United States, studi es
are beginning to show that black women are nearl y ten times more likely
than other women to be reported to child wei fare agencies for drug use
during pregnancy, and that at least seventy percent of the prosecutions are
of women of color.> Additionally, over eighty percent of coun-ordercd
cesarean sections have been for \.VOmen of co lor and non-native United
States women. These women arc vi1tually always dependent on public
health care fac ilities: What's wrong with this picture?
ln December 1990, Norplant, the contrncepti ve implant, was approved
in the United States. 5 Almost immediately, cou11s attempted to impose
the implantation of Norpbnt a a condition of probation on women
convicted of child abuse. 0 In seventy-five percent of these cases, the
probationers have been minonty women, and all of them have been
welfare recipients. 7 What's wrong w ith this picture?
Liberals argue that women contracting mto so-called surrogate mother
arrangements should be held to the1r contracts.~o; Since these contracts are
usually sought by men who \vant the!!· own sperm used to progenerate,
this wou ld ensure that lhcs~ men obtain children who are genetically
14 19 ( 199 1).
1

Roberts. supra note I. at I ~·2 i.

1

/d. at 1434.

~

Ga llagher,s11pra nmc : . ac 35·+.
s rvtelissa Burke, Note, 7i'Ie Con.srittdionaliry o.f the U'ie qf the Nmplam
Contraceptive: Del'ice ,,s a Ccmditiflll of' Pl·tJt]a rion , 20 I {A STII·JGS C'ONs·r. L.Q.
107. 207 ( 1992).
h /d.
1
See Joan C. Ca llahan. Co!ln·u~.-·,_,Jnioil or fncarcera;ion: What's Wrona wirh
this Picwre?, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y R!·V. 6"1 (1996); Burke, s upra no te 5, at 24 1.
s See, e.g., JOHN ROBERTSON, { fill DREl-l OF C HOICE: FREEDOM AND THF..
NEW R~PRODUCTIVE Tt:CHNOt.Or;ll;'> ( 1 99~f ). We take it that t he tenn ·'suiTogatc
mother" is nu longer acccptalJk Mi;sim:-diy, the lCm1 b.;gs the question of who
is the real mother nf a t:hild btJf1l iiS tk r.::sult uf a contract amangement. Birth
mothers are certainly bi o l ogic~ I mo1 h~rs or. the chi ldren they bear and birth, even
when they are not genr..:tic mDthers. ('L•ntract motherhood aiTangements between
women anJ men usually 111\ olv.; ~'rogem~t·ation from the man's sperm a11d the
gestational mother's egg, making her as ftJ!Iy the ~:hlld's genetic parent as the
geneti c father. To ca ll such a -.vcnnan a "surrogate" mother (as was done in the
case of Baby M) is to elevate u :nan's g\~n :;tic r;onne•; tion to a child over a
woman's gc:stational and genr:Li1· ('l•nMeiil'n io 1hat child. The 1.:rn1 "smJ"ogatc"
is just one cx.nmple of how de.~p ly r-tJllbf:dded mal.:! r rivileg~ i~. in our so..;iety.
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related to them. Even wi thout state enforcement of these contracts, in
every case that has gone ro court m the United States, men have
succeeded in gai ning custody of resulting children who are genetically
related to them, whether or not the gestational mothers seeking custody
were also the genetic mothers of the children at issue. 9 What's wrong
with this picture?
Specialized fertility services (such as ovulation drugs, 10 in vitro
fertilization ("IVF") and embryo trans fer, 11 gamete intra fallopian
transfer ("GIFT"), 12 zygote intrafallopian transfer ("ZIFT"), 13 artificial
insemination, 14 surgery, or other treatment for blocked fallopian
tubes 15) are twice as likely to be obtained by non-Hispanic white women
than by Hispanic or non-Hispanic black women seeking treatment for
impaired fecundity, and three times more likely to be obtained by such
women who have household incomes at least 149% above the poverty
level than by those with lower household incomes. 16 What's wrong with
this picture?
What is wrong with all of these pictures is that they suggest that there
are systematic inequities along the axes of sex, race, and class in several
areas of contemporary human reproduction. We find these inequities
troubling. Our purpose in this paper is threefold: ( 1) to suggest how
9

See. e.g., Christine Overall, The Case Against the Legalization ofContract
M01herhood, in C HRISTINE OVERALL, HUMAN REPRODUCTION: P RI~CIPLES,
PRACTICES. POLICIES 119 (1993); Rosemarie Tong, Feminis t Perspectives and
Gestational Motherhood: The Search for a Unified Legal Focus, in REPRODUC-

SS (Joan C. Callahan cd.,
);
and
several
of
the
papers
In
SURROGATE
YI
OTII
ERI-IOOD: POLl' riC$ AND
1995
PRIVACY (Carry Gostin ed., 1990).
111
Drugs that cause the maturation of several of a woman's eggs at one time.
11
''In vitro ferti lization" IS feni lization of onl! or more of a woman's eggs
outside of her body, e.g., in a petri dish. ''Embryo transfer" is the removal of an
embryo from one woman 's uterus and placement of it in another woman's uterus.
1
~ "Gamete intrafallopian transfer" is the transfer of gametes (i.e., eggs
and/or sperm) into a woman's fallopinn tube.
IJ "Zygote inrrafallopian transfer" is the transfer of a newly fertilized egg
or zygote into a woman's fallopian tube.
14
"Artificial insemination" is the insemination of a woman with rechnological assistance, e.g., with a syringe.
15
The fa ll opian tubes allow the transport of a woman's eggs from her
ovaries to her uterus. Fertilization or conception usua lly occurs in the fallopian
tubes.
16
Lynna S. Wilcox & William D. Mosh~.!r, Use vfl!!{t;mility Services in the
United States, OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY. July 1993, at 122, l 24.
TION, ETHICS, AND THE L AW: FEM INIST PERSPL:C I"IVES
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contemporary liberal theory leads to these inequities, (2) to contribute to
a systematic articulation and illumination of a feminist social justice
approach to questions of law and policy that addresses concerns about
these system ati~ inequities, and (3) to show why this approach should be
standard in any society that purports to take the interests of all its citizens
equally seriously, no matter what their social location. In particular, we
mean to show that a feminist social justice approach better serves the
fundamental moral ideals embraced by liberalism, namely individual
liberty and the moral equality of persons, than does contemporary liberal
theory. We do this by focu sing on contemporary reproduction-assisting
technologies as a case study to help see where contemporary liberalism
leaves us in regard to these technologies and why that position is
deficient on each of the liberal's own axiological axes of liberty and
equality.
l. THE F EMfNIST

A.

SOCIAL JUSTICF! REJECTION OF LIBERALISM

Liberal individualism as Jdeolog11

Liberal individualism is a set of general ideas that purports to explain
the world and leads to the structuring of society and its political
institutions according to a set of nonnative convictions that cohere with
the explanatory beliefs intemal to the system. That is 1 liberal individualism functions as an idr.!o logy with certain fund amental ontological
commitments and consequenl moral commitments. Liberal individualism
operates according to methods that fol low from these ontological and
moral commitments. An examination of any ideo logy, such as liberal
individualism, wi ll concern itself wi th (l) how a paiiicular system of
beliefs conceptualizes human nature, (2) how that conceptualization of
human nature is linked to normative beliefs regarding morally appropriate
distributions of power and goods in society, and (3) what ontological
commitments and moral values are embedded in the methods the system
uses to interpret, constmct, evaluate) and revise social and political
institutions and practices, and to interpret, evaluate, and influence
individual behaviors. In short, an ideology shapes the way a group looks
at the world. It functions as a kind of perceptual screen or filter that
interprets reality factually, evaluates it nom1atively, and leads to certain
positions on what are considered social problems and how those problems
should be reso lved. As an ideology, Hberal indi vidualism presumes an
ontology of persons which tends to lead tu a particular set of substantive,
nom1ative and methodological commitments. As we shall see, ::1 femini st
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social justice approach rejects these components of contemporary
liberalism.
B.

The L iberal Ontology of Persons and tlze Liberal Morality
of Rights

Historically, liberalism arose in Europe between the Reformation and
the French Revolution as a reaction to the power of kings, aristocrats, and
the church. One of the fi rst systematizers of liberal theory was John
Locke, who inspired Thomas Jefferson, and whose Second Treatise of
Civil Government 11 directly underpins the United States Bill of Rights.
Locke conceived the human person as, fundamental ly, an atomistic entity
-a full-fl edged human being existi ng prior to society, making up (to mix
the metaphors) a kind of ontological moral space that cannot be
transgressed without permission. Political auth01ity, in Locke's view, can
only be justified on the ground of consent of the governed. All "men"
come into the world on an equal moral footing, with equal entitlements
to goods and powers and equal entitlements to freedom. Now, Locke, of
course, was systematizing a political theory for Whigs. When he said "all
men" he did not actually mean that. What he meant was dictated by his
own experience of who counted- propenied men, including landholders,
merchants and industrialists, who should not be subject to an absolute
monarch. This, of course, did not include women generally) or men or
women of the underclass in particul ar. 18 So, from the very beginning of
its systematization, liberalism was structured from a perspecti ve that
included some persons but not others. Indeed, Locke himscJf provides the
first fu lly systematic argument for cap1tallsm and the right to amass
virtually unlimited amounts of property, a strange 1rony m a theory which
starts out so uncqutvocally commmed to the moral equality of all persons
and the initial right of each person to have ''as much and as good" as any
other.
The atomistic ontology of persons underpinning Locke's theory
continues to anchor liberalism in its several contemporary vari eti es,
including liberal femi nism, which we shall discus$ shortly. Filled out, the
fundamen tal soctal notion at work m li beral ontology is that persons arc
radically individualized agents, that the un iqueness of human beings is

1
;

JOHN

LOCKE,

SECOND T REATISE

DeKoster cd., 1978) (I 689).
1
~ See, e.g., C AROLE PATEMt\N,

or

CIVIL GOVERNMENT

T JI F.DISORJJF.R OF WO~I EI\

PATEMAN, T HE SF.XUAL CoNmAcr ( 1938).

(Lester

( 1989); CAROLE

l 202
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characterized by the capacity for rationality and autonomy, and that the
protection of indi vidual autonomy is the keystone of a moraJJy wellordered society. The ontological understanding of human beings as
radically discrete and autonom ous tends to issue in a morality that rests
fundamentally on rights that define the moral boundaries of these
essentially unconnected individuals. Thus, Lockean liberalism find s itself
committed to a morality that is preoccupied with respecting and
negotiating these independent moral spaces. Such a world view starts out
conceptualizing persons as adversarially related, and sets the stage for a
political society that needs to be based on managing adversity. This
human ontology and its consequent contemporary construction of
fundamental morality as a morality of overriding rights to noninterference
is central to feminist sociaJ justice rejections of liberalism.

C.

Feminism and Liberal Feminism

Although all views appropriately characterized as femi nist v iews are
concerned with the posJtion and fl ounshing of all women, it is crucially
important to realize that feminism is not monolithic. lndeed, feminists
disagree about a great many issues. Feminist perspectives can be found
in moral and political theories as diverse as rights-based liberalism,
Utilitarianism, and Marx ism, and in ontologies that range from essentialist
accounts that ascribe a un ique nature to women, through pure social
construction accounts of women 's narure, 19 to positional feminisms that
attempt to avoid the problems with essenti alist and antiessentialist
fcm ini.sms by leaving open the question of women 's essential nature and
concentrating instead on how the social position of women raises
problems for women as such.2c1
At the same time, however, we understand all views that are
coherently understood as femi nist views to share certain features, namely:

19

For extended di scu~si ons of variations in feminist thought, see, for

example, JOSEPH INE
TRADITIONS

or:

DO~ OVAN,

FEMIN I T

TH EORY:

THE

lNTELLECfUAL

AMERI CAN FtMINISM ( 1985); ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST

POUTICS A\!D HUMAN N .<\TURE ( 1983 ); ROSEMARlE TONG , F EMIN IST THOUGHT:

A COMPREHENSIV E I NTRODUCTION ( 1989).
2
''

For an account of the problems with both essentialist and antiessentialist,
or nominalist, feminisms, see Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus PostSt1'11cwralism: Th e fd~ntily Crisis in Feminist Th emy, 13 SIGNS 405 ( 1988)
(attempting to avoid ·lhese problems in a theory that rejects a commitment to
essentialism but allows that, in fact, women as a class have a gendl!rcd identity
that leads to certain characteiistica1!y ''women's needs" in the present world).
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(1) a recognition that women as a group have been and remain in

a

subordinate position in relation to men;
(2) an account of the source(s) of that subordination; and
(3) suggestions for how the subordmation of women can be overcome.21
Recent feminist approaches, particularly in the work of women of
color, frequently mclude:
(4) an account of the ways tn which women have resisted oppres.
??
s10n. -·
It is also the case that contemporary femi mst approaches are almost
invariably:
(5) acutely aware that social subordination is not limited to women,
and
(6) deeply comm itted to the elimination of centrisms that systematically place members of one group in a position of lesser value than
persons of other groups (centrisms such as sexism, racism, heterosexism,
regionalism, classism, ageism, and ableism).
It is also common for contemporary feminists to:
(7) understand these systems of subordination and oppression as
inteilocking in the sense that one cannot hope for the elimination of one
without accomplishing the elimination of others.
These, then, are the features we take to be essentially (1 -3) and
commonly (4-7) associated with a feminist consciousness or perspective
in any domain.
"Liberal feminists" were the first to recognize women as a sexual
class, that is, to recognize women as in a collective position in relation
to men. As Zillah Eisenstein points out: "Liberal feminism is not
feminism merely added to li beralism. Rather, rhere is a real difference
belween liberalism and liberal feminism in t.hat feminism requires a
recogn ition, however implicit and undefined, of the sexual-class
ident itication of women as women."23 Li.beral feminism is so called
Alison M. Jaggar, Femini~·t Ethics, in E:-!CYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 36 1
(Laurence C. Becker & Chai·l ot!~ 8. Becker eds., 1992); cf .ROSEMARI E TONG,
F'EMI NJNE AND FEMINIST ETHICS I 0- l ! ( 1993) (explaimng Alison Jaggar's view
that a femm1st approach to ethtcs see;<s to: "1. arttculatc moral crit1ques of
~ct i ons and pract1ces that perptetuatc:women's subordination; 2. prescribe morally
j ustifiable ways of resisting such actions and practices; and 3. envision morally
desirable alternatives that wi li promote women's emancipation'').
22
See, e.g., PATRICIA H. COLLINS, BLACK FEMlNIST T HOUGHT: KNOWL11

EDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND ·1HE POLITICS OF POWER I 1991).
23
ZILLA I I R. El SE~lSTETN, 'Tllf RADICAL Fr.JTURE Of liBc.:Ra.r_ FEMINISM 6
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because it at once shares the essential commitments that bind characteristically feminist views (i.e., minimally, features 1-3 above), while also
sharing the fundamental ontological and n01mative commitments of
liberalism - commitments that "postliberal feminists" have rejected. For
example, like liberals simpliciter, liberal fem inists assume that persons are
radically individualized autonomous agents, that the uniqueness of human
beings is located in the capacity for rationality and autonomy, and that
the protection of individual autonomy is the keystone of a morally wellordered society. The ontological and axiological commitment to
individual autonomy that informs liberalism and liberal feminism tends
to issue in a morality of rights. In addition to being the source of later
femini sms, 24 the great contribution of liberal feminism has been its
insistence that a political system that protects the interests of men but not
of women will not bear moral scrutmy.
D.

Postliberal Feminisms and the Feminist Social Justice Approach

Common to postliberaJ feminist positions is the rej ection of the liberal
ontology of the person as we have sketched it, and, with it, the liberal's
extreme emphasis on individual liberty to the exclusion of values such as
the nurturing of individuals and communities, the sustaining of relati onships, the relief of suffering, and attention to appropriate substantive
equality. ln rejecting liberal feminism, postliberal femini sts contend that
liberal fem inism has committed itself to a morality which emphasizes
separation between persons rather than the connections and interdependencies bet\;veen persons. 25 ln other words, the charge is that liberal
feminists have, with liberals, committed themselves to what Alison Jaggar
calls "no1111ativc dualism"20 and "political solipsism:m These commitments together lead to "political skepticism" 23 and, hence, the liberal's
( 1981 ).
14

See E ISENSTEIN, supra note 23.
See JAGGAR, s upra note 19.
26
Nonnative dualism is the view that what is especially valuable about
human beings is their ''mental" capacity for rationality. !d.
27
Political soli psism is the view that hu111an beings are essentially solitary
or isolated, self-sufficient entities, with intere:;ts and needs essentia lly ditlerent
and separate from, and often in opposition to, those of others. Jd.
28
Political skepticism is the view that questions pertaining to the well·being
of indi viduals can have no common answers. !d.
25
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placing an inordinate premium on the liberty of this rational, autonomous,
solitary person to be and do what he or she destres. 2!1
Postliberal feminists join in departing from the liberal's and liberal
feminist's commitment to this atom iStic v1ew of persons and tend to insist
that persons ''arrive" in the world already mcxtricably imbedded in webs
of relationships- in social contexts that in gTeat pan detennine who they
are and what they will become as individuals, as well as where their
responsibilities will lie. The rejection here is of what is known as
"abstract individualism,"30 which treats persons for the purposes of
political theory as individuals abstracted out of all social contexts. This
abstraction is a familiar theme in the works of John Locke, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and other
liberal moral and political theorists, but it fails to describe real persons.
Rather, postliberal feminists conceive of persons more like knots in a net
than li ke discrete balls that might be contained in a net- there is no knot
in a net without coru1ections to other knots.
This is the ontology of persons that the postliberal feminist position
shares with communitarianism. But this feminist position is not directly
subject to the central moral objection that liberals commonly bring
again · t communitarians. namely, that they reject individual libe11y as a
central moral value. When the posll iberal feminist challenges abstract
individualism and the concept of autonomy as they work in liberal theory,
she is concerned not to totally disregard the moral importance of
individual libe1ty, but to direct attention to thi.! real lives of real women
with all the substantial impingements on liberty that characterize those
lives. She wants to lay bare the social realities of women's lives that
expose as mythology the doctrine of full autonomy upon which liberal
theory rests. She wants society to see that characteristically male li ves (i n
United States soc1ety, particularly economically privi leged, white male
lives) tend tO fit the ontological assumptions of liberalism far better than
characteristi c<lli y female live:; (parti cularly the lives of working class and
poor non-white women). If we look carefull y at ou r major social
institutions and the social positiOns w '"'·hich the most substantial oc1al,
political, and economic benefits attach. we shall find (virtually invan ab ly)
that they are structured by men, that their standards tor success and

19 JAGGAR, s11pra note 19, at 40--+2; see also T ONG, supra note 2 1 at 35.
30
Naomi Scheman, !ndi,·iduolism and r/lc Objects of Psychology, in
DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPFCTIVES ON EPISTFMO t..OGY, lVf.E'I APHYSICS, M ETHODOLOGY. AND THE Pli!I.OSOPIIY OF SC I E~CE. 225 (Sandra Harding &

Me1Till B. Hintikka ed, ., 1983).
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reward in one way or another promote dominance and competition as
fundamental values, and that those standards for success and reward often
presume as the nonn and best suit the realities of life for (particularly
relatively privileged, white) men.31
For example, the expectations of the professional in the contemporary
university, the contemporary corporation, or the professions of law and
medicine are typically set by men and most easily met by men - men
who are fi·ee to concentrate on their professional lives, often (indeed,
usually) with women in the background to manage their households and
serve as primary care providers for their children.32 Privileged men have
been the generators of liberalism and its individualistic ontology of
persons. It cannot seriously be considered coincidental that men, who are
so often most free to fun ction autonomously (that is, relatively unimpaired by the requirements of households, children, and community) are
also the primary creators and adm inistrators of contemporary institutions
that encourage an emphasis on extreme mdividualism, productivity, and
competition between persons rather than an emphasis on community,
nurturing, and connectedness between persons - an emphasis that is
common - indeed, generally necessary - in characteristically female
lives. 33
These are among the hidden din1ensions and implications of
liberalism that the postliberal feminist seeks to reveal. Her purpose is to
show that moral considerations other than just individual liberty should
command our uncompromising allegiance. This is because the focus on
individual liberty in liberalism, from its .inception, detracts from concern
for recognizing the basic moral equality of all persons by favoring those

31

No claims about essentialism are presumed here. The point is just that
men's lives commonly have certain charactei'istics, women's lives commonly
have certain characLeristics, and that these common characteristics are not the
same for men and women. This poinl is compatible with essentialism, nominalism, and positionalism. For a number of views on sexual difference, see
THEORETI CAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL D IFFERENCE (Deborah L. Rhode ed. ,
1990). For a discussion of difference more generally1 see MART HA MtNOW,
MAKfNG ALL Tl IE D I FFERENCE: I NCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW

(l 990).
32

This is an example of what we mean hy a feature common to "characteristically male lives'' - men commonly have spou:.es who bear primary
responsibility for hou!)eholds and child care; women commonly do .not.
33
For just one discussion of how the features of characteristically male
lives press aw~ty from nurturina, -::ommunity, a11d connectedness, see Annette
Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 23 1 (1986).

1995-96]

A FEMIKIST SOCIAL JUSTrCE APPROACII

1207

whose lives best match the li beral ontology of persons. Concerned about
individual liberty, then, the postlibera! femimst is also concerned about
individual welfare and about the dismantling of systems that serve the
welfare of some while ignoring the welfare, substantive freedom, and
equitable treatment of others. The noti on of respect for persons that so
deeply infonns liberal theory is construed more broadly on these accounts
- respecting another person is not just limited to leaving her alone;
respecting another person involves attending to the cond itions that are
necessary for her thriving. And it also means seeing that she has equally
availabl e to her the basic conditions of meaningful self-direction. On
these accounts, then, liberalism's emphas is on individual liberty and, in
particular, its conceptualization of individual liberty as negative liberty or
noninterference, leads to the creation and continuation of social and
political structures that do not take seriously enough the moral equality
of all persons, regardless of their social location.
E.

Liberalism as a Conservative Social and Political Theo1y

It is important to emphasize that feminists who reject liberalism as
inadequate to address important questions of eq uity, need not fail to see
the crucial contributions of liberal theory as it emerged in the West.
Liberal ism, compared to the systems agrunst which it developed in
reaction (feudalism, absolutism, aristocracy, and traditional patriarchy),
is an enormous moral achievement, and feminists generally recognize
this. The problem is that liberal ism has exhausted its progressive
potential. An alternative social and political theory needs to be developed
to address the substantive quesnons of maldistribution of power among
moral equals, an tssue which liberaltsm has been unable to address. 34
Though once progresstvc because of its msistence on greater freedom and
inclusion, liberalism today is conservative m the sense that it preserves
the selecti ve inclusion with which liberalism began, leaving intact systems
that continue to subordinate some groups to others.
11.

CONCERNS ABOUT HARM

It is a feature of traditional liberal rhetoric that the only ground on
which the state might interfere with the liberty of individuals is to prevent

~ See, e.g., ELIZABETH fRAZER & NICOLA LACEY, TilE POLITICS OF
COMMUNITY: A f EMINIST CRITIQUE OF TilE LIBERAL-COio..IML'NITARIAI\' DEBATE
3

ch. 3 (1993).
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hann. The classic statement of this view, of course, 1s tn John Stuart
Mill 's On Liberty.35 Although Mill is a Utilitarian and Locke is a rightsbased theorist, Utilitarians such as Mill share with Lockeans an atomistic
ontology of persons. In Mi ll 's theory, this ontology is combined with a
psychology that leads to the claim that happines must be the fundamental
ground of morality, and the general happiness the fundamental ground of
the j ust state. According to Mill, in order fo r this to be achieved, people
must be left as free as possible. 36 Stated in other terms, this view
requires that individuals not be interfered with except to prevent
(unjustifiabl.e) harm to others.
This tenet of liberal theory informs one objection that has been raised
against a feminist social justice approach to reproduction-assisting
technologies. The most thorough treatment to date of the liberal position
on these technologies ha. been offered by John Robertson. 37 An
objection he bri ngs against feminist social justice approaches is that the
ham1s that feminists argue are associated with reproduction-assisting
technologies are merely sym boltc - they are not real, tangible harms.
Thus, for example, Robertson says femmist concerns that contract
motherhood arrangements commodify women and children amount to no
more than ··a perception of the symbolic effects of treating gestation as

)

5

JOHNS. M ILL,

On Liberty , in UTILJT;\RIANISl'vl A?\0 0TIIER W RITINGS 126

(Mary Warnock cd., 1974) ( 1859).
36

37-4 1 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., 197 1)
( 1861), wh~rc he argues that human beings are constructed psychologica lly so
that the only thing we can rccogn izl.! as intrinsically good is happiness. Since we
cannot recognize anything else as being good in itself, and since ·'ought" implies
'·can," the on ly reasonable ground for morali ty is the production of happiness.
By parity of reasoning, the only j ustification for state authority is the production
of happiness. Since everyone counts as one and no more than one, and since the
community/citizenry is no more th;.ln tht! sum of its parts, the state should select
that set of rules and practices (including that set of laws) which will tend to
produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number. Mill also holds
that each individual wi ll (in general) be the best judge of his or her own interest
and happim:ss. Thus, people should be left tl·ee to govem their own lives, and
should be limi ted only to prevent them from ham1 ing others. For Mill , too, then,
atomistic inJividualism leads to a political theory that emphasizes individual
liberty. Liberalism as we understand it here, and a· it is commonly understood
in po litical theory. includes both rights-based th~orists such as Locke and goalbased theorists such as Mil l. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying tex t.
JJ ROBERTSON. Sllp!"Ci nolc 8.
See JOHNS. MILL, UTILITARIAN ISM
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a product to be sold for money. " 38 There are at least three problems
lurking in this logical woodpile.
A.

Harm as the Only lVforally Relevant Concern

The first problem with liberal arguments such as Robertson's is that
they presume, without argument, that interferences with individual liberty
can only be justified if they are undertaken to prevent harm to others.
This is certainly what Mill explicitly committed himself to in On Liberty
when he said that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is
to prevent hann to others. "39 But political theorists know that Mill
himself departed from this "one very simple principle,"~ 0 even within
On Liberty.
Even if Mill had not so departed from the harm principle. moral
agents in contemporary society simply do not accept the ham1 principle.
That is, the prevention of harm does not constitute the only justification
for any interference with individual liberty. Consider, for example,
mandatory education, mandatory payment into social security, or property
laws that disallow someone's use of another's property, even though that
use would not in any way hann the owner (e.g.. a homeless person's
sleeping during winter in someone's unoccupied summ er cottage, perhaps
leaving it in better condition than she found it). Society allows all sorts
of interferences with individual liberty for reasons other than the
prevention of harm; in particular, restraints on li berty are allowed for
reasons having to do with the public good and the protection of rights,
irrespective of considerations of ha.nn. Therefore, liberals cannot simply
presume that the preventi on of hann is the only reason that coul d justify
restricting the development, application, and/or acceptance of reproduction-assisting technologJes:11 There may be other sound policy reasons

------------------------------------------------------38

/d. at 141. Liberal feminist law profes sor Lo1i Andrews m::tkes a similar
claim regarding a number of the arguments that feminists have used to argue for
the moral unacceptability of commercial so-called surrogate mother arrangements. See Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: 7'he Challenge for
Feminists , in SURROGi\TF. MC)TifF.R/1000: POUTlCS t\ND P RI VACY 167, 17 1 ~78
(Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
39
Mi ll, s11pra note 35, at \35.
40

41

Jd.

Liberals do not take this rhetoric to heart, either; Robertson himself
disallows certain uses of reproductive technologies for what he would have to
term ''symbol ic" reasons. ROB!: R 1 SON, Sttpra note 8.
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for introducing some restrictions on these practices. That much said,
however, it needs to be pointed out that feminist social justice proponents
generally are not subject to the objection that they support interference
with individual liberty in most of these matters.
B.

Interfering with Liberty: A Bright Red Herring

Liberals such as Robertson make the (unacceptable) claim that only
prevention of harm can justify interference with individual liberty. 42 But
more often than not, feminists simply are not arguing for interference
with individual liberty. Virtually all existing vers ions of a fem inist social
justice approach would allow access to anyone desiring to use reproduction-assisting technologies. Much of the feminist discussion on reproduction-assisting technologies can be understood as engagement in moral
suasion. Even though many femimsts disagree with the development and
deployment of reproduction-aSsisting technologies, ranging from IVF to
contract motherhood, tew argue that it should be illegal for individuals
to develop, apply, and/or personally usc these methodologies. Tn general,
the objection that femi nist social j ustice theonsts are calling lor severe
interferences wjth reproducttve liberty attacks a "straw man.'' Although
a number of postliberal feminists have argued for a prohibition on
brokering commercial surrogacy contracts and for the courts' refusal to
enforce these contracts,~ 3 the argument for prohibition of brokering
commercial surrogacy contracts is a far cry from the claim that all such
arrangements should be absol utely prohibited by law, which wo uld make
individual parties who set up nonenforceable forms of these arrangements
liable to legal sanction. No femi nist that we have read has supponcd this
position. To argue that the development and dep loyment of these
tecllnologies arc harmtld to women and children (whi ch femin ists have
frequently argued and which we shall argue in a moment) is not
equivalent to arguing that the development, application, or use of any of
these methodologies should be prohibited by law. Discussions, such as
Robertson 's,+' that present the position of femin ist social j ustice theorists
this way grossly misrepresent most versions of this kind of position.

4

4

~ See s11pra
l

See, e.g.,

notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
supra note 9: CHRISTI NE

0VERJ\LL.

OVERALL, ETHICS AND

H UMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 11 )-36 ( 19H7); Margaret Radin,
Marker Inalienability, IOU H:'\RV. L. REv. 1349, 192 1-36 ( 1987).
4
'
See supra notr::s 39-4 1 and accompanying text.
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Symbolic Versus Tangible Harms

The final problem with the liberal position on the matter of hann is
that it characterizes the hanns of concern to feminist social justice
theorists as merely symbolic. First, by characterizing the harms at issue
as "symbolic," liberals try to do away with a problem by manipulating
the label for it. "Symbolic" harms, by definiti on, are not real hanns. But
the hanns that concern feminist social justice theorists are very real. That
they are often insidious makes them no tess tangible.
The harms that concern feminist social justice theorists are those that
result from deeply entrenched, continuing social centrisms, such as
racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, ableism, an.d
ageism. Who could reasonably deny that in a society where women still
do not receive pay equal to men's for the same work, 45 women are not
harmed by institutions and practices that contribute to their subordinate
position to men? Who could reasonably deny that people of color are
hanned by their systemi c exclusion from the social, political, and
economic mainstream? Who could reasonably deny that when our public
spaces are inaccessible to those who are not of "normal" ability that such
people are deprived of important goods available to the rest of us - that
is, they are harmed? Who could reasonably deny that gay men and ·
lesbians are harmed by social systems that refi.tse to assure them the same
protections and benefits that are provided for heterosexuals? That we
cannot say in advance what precise individual wi ll suffer what precise
harm is not a reason to deny that the hanns in question are real harms.
Women are ham1ed by attitudes, institutions, and practices that serve
to keep women in a position subordinate to the position of men. Insofar
as reproductiOn-assisting technologies contribute to the subordinate
position of women, they are harmful. There is nothing symbolic about
that. Feminists have extensively argued that reproduction-assisting
technologies do conttibute tO the subordination of women by continuing
to tie the value of women to rC}XOduction. The !JOint 15 that if a systern
serves to privilege members ot some groups over members of others, the
system hanns those in the subordmate groups. Because reproductiOnassisting technologies contribute to the pnvilegmg of some over others,
then they are harmful. And the concrete ha1ms associated with subordination of groups in our society are substantial. Therefore, even if it were
the case that prevention of harm alone could justify restricti ons on

5

Grac,~

Schneider, Women to Raise Financial Fists {or Equal Pay,
COURIER~JOURNJ\L (Louisvi it c), Oct. 29, 1995, at 8 l.
"'
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individual li berty, feminist social justice theorists have (and have used)
an argument based on tangible harm to deploy against the development,
application, and personal use of reproduction-assisting techno logies.
Indeed, the moral centerpiece of feminist social justice approaches to
reproduction-assisting technologies is that these technologies privilege
some (namely, well-off white men) over others, and that they are,
therefore, harmful in virttte of this contribution to a system of social
subordination.
D.

Conternporary Liberalistn as a Deontological Th eory

There is a final point which needs to be made about the liberal
objection that feminist social justice theorists are concerned only about
symbolic hanns. This view is sometimes expressed as a complaint about
"deontological ... reverence," to use the words of John Robertson. 46
This is a strange objection, however, coming from a rights-based liberal
theorist such as Robertson. Robertson 's own li beral v1ew begins with a
rock-bottom commitment to strong moral nghts, especiall y the right of
individuals to be at liberty. In making moral rights foundational to
morality and the construction of a just soctety, contemporary liberals
foll ow Locke rather than Mill, who espoused a goal-based view of
rights. 41 Robertson's approach to rights fo llows that put forward by
Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin asserts that basic moral rights have priority
over ends-based considerations. Thus, Dworkin holds that whenever
moral rights come into play, they "tmmp'' other considerat ions. 48 This
is precisely the language Robertson uses throughout his discussions of
reproductive liberty; bu t such a view is paradigmatically deontological.
Deontological views are conceptually opposed to teleological views .
The deonto logist denies the tcleologist's claim that consequences (real or
probable) are the whole ofthe moral story. Some deontologists (Kant, for
example) hold that consequences never aftect the moral value or disvaluc
6

John A. Robertson, The Rightne.)·s of Rights Analysis: A Response 10
Dorothy Roberr.1·, 20 L. & Soc. iN QUIRY I 023, 1027 (1995).
~ 7 Lockean liberalism JS <.~ri ghts-based view; that is, this fonn of liberalism
takes strong moral rights to be foundmional. Millean liberalism, on the other
hand, is a goal-based view: it recognizes rights only insofar as they are thought
to maximize the general good. Thus, ti·om Mi ll ''i Utilitarian viewpoint, rights are
not foundational - they arc derivativ..: from uti lity. Th is makes for crucial
differences in these classical lib.;ral view$. Most contemporary liberals are of the
rights-based variety.
-Ill See. e.g., RONALD DWORK!'J, TAI<JNG R tGHTS SER lOUSL'r' 259~65 ( 1978 ).
·'

1995-96]

A FEMINIST SOClAL JUST!CE APPROACH

12 13

of an action (or practice). Others adm it consequences as morally relevant
considerations; they just deny that conseq uences alone mvanably
determine the nghtness or wrongness of actiOnS and/or practtces. And so
it is that rights-based moral theonsts are deontologists, smce they hold
that rights, rather than consequences, sit at the foundattons of morality
and must sit at the foundations of a JUSt society. Feminist social justice
theorists are concerned that social and political systems take seriously the
moral equality of persons. Such concerns are, by their very nature,
deontological. But that is no criticism of them, particularly from a rightsbased perspective. To place the liberty of individuals at the foundations
of morality and the just state is equally dcontological; and so complaints
about "deontological reverences" are applicable (if they are applicable at
all) to rights-based liberal views, such as Robertson's itself.
Our general points on the matter of harm, then, are these: (l)
considerations other than harm should command our moral allegiance and
may justify interference with individuallibcny; (2) fem inist social justice
theorists generally do not argue for interference with individual liberty as
regards reproduction-assisti ng technologies, except in the case of
brokering contract mother arrangements, which a number of feminists
have argued should not be lawfu l; and (3) individuals suffer very real and
substantial harms by being in socially subordinate positions; thus any'
practices that contribute to the subordination of some groups by others
are harmful. Since reproduction-assisting technologies contri bute to a
system of social subordination they are harmful.
111.

THE M YTH OF LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
AND THE MAT'!'hR OF H/\R..\-1 REVISITED

A.

The Charge of Legal lvforalism

Liberals also object to a feminist social justice approach on the
ground that it is a form of legal moralism. The rhetoric of li beral political
theory requires that the governJnent rematn neutral among competing
conceptions of morality to protect ci ti zen'' against the impositiOn of state
orthodoxy. Liberals therefore try ro "set aside or 'bracket' controversial
moral and religious conceptions few purposes of J U~ tice. ,~y The liberal
notion of procre3tlve liberty allows .ach Individual to choose her own
moral understanding of procrr!ntlon for hcr·lel C so long as she causes no

~9 Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argwnent and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and

f-lomosexuality, 77

C AL .

L.

RF.V.

521 , 52 1 ( 1989).
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harm to others. The United States Supreme Court appli es this approach
to questions of reproductive rights, defending the right to an abortion as
an aspect of "fi·eedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life
" 50

Under this view, a fem inist social justice approach to assisted
reproduction improperly reflects a particular moral view about reproduction which individuals in a pluralistic society should remain free to reject.
Liberals understand the fem inist concern that contract pregnancy
arrangements devalue women's role in reproduction, for example, as a
moral position that is entitled to no more government deference than the
moral position that these arrangements further women's autonomy. As
Robertson explains, "reasonable people have different moral perceptions
about paid surrogacy, with many not findin g the symbolic demeaning of
motherhood that others see as so glaringly wrong."51 By asking the
government to choose between these competing moral views, liberals
argue, femi nists violate the neutrality requirement.
Liberals, of course, must demonstrate that their notion of procreative
freedom does not rely on similar moral judgments. This is attempted by
trying to distinguish between personal conceptions of morality that are
irrelevant to government decisionmak:ing and tangible hanns to individuals, which may properly be weighed against procreati ve interests. This
distinction, however, cannot withstand careful scrutiny, for liberal
defenses of procreative liberty reduce to a moral position about the value
of procreation.
The primacy liberals accord procn.:ation, based panly on the
importance to personal identity of genetic transmission, reflects a
panicular and contested view of reproduction. Liberals contend that
procreative liberty deserves privileged status because of its importance to
personal conceptions of identity and the meaning of life. ln what sense
is the decision to procreatr.:; central to personal identity? Answering this
question involves moral .iudgments about the meaning aml importance of
reproduction.
In responding for liberals, Robertson centers on the human desire for
genetic connection with offspring. Although he concedes tbat th is desire
is at least partly socially constmcted, Robertson explains it in biological
terms: ''(A]t the most basit: level transmission of one's genes through
reproduction is an animal or species urge closely linked to the sex

50
51

Doe v. Bolton, 41 0 U.S. 179,211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 141.
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drive."52 But, of course, the fact that animals have a natural urge to have
sex in no way whatever entails that they have a natural urge to transmit
their genes. Robertson's claim here 1s an example of what used to be
called "anthropomorphism/' and is now known as an example of "the
social construction of biology."
Further, this belief in the importance of genetic destiny to personal
identity seems to contradict the liberal 1mage of the autonomous, selfchoosing individual. An examination of the role the genetic tie plays in
defining personal identity, creating children, and detennining legal
parentage demonstrates the sttiking indeterminacy of its legal and social
meaning.53 The importance of genetic relatedness is not determined by
biology, but by culture. Even within our legal system, its meaning varies
depending on the context. Although we generally assume that the genetic
tie creates an enduring bond between parents and their chi ldren, the law
often disregards it, for example, in the cases of contract mothers, sperm
donors, and unwed fathers.54
A comparison of liberals' defense of procreati ve choices and
feminists' identification of ham1s reveals a striking similarity in their
moral explanations of the significance of procreation. Consider, fo r
example, Robertson's refutation of Margaret Radin 's argument that paid
pregnancy arrangements commodify women and chi ldrcn. 55 Radin
contends that childbearing should not be traded on the market because
"commodification of women's reproductive capacity is ham1ful for the
identity aspect of personhood and . . . the closeness of paid surrogacy to
baby·selling harms our self-conception too deeply." 56 Robe1ison
criticizes Radin for failing to show why payment for gestation is
52

!d. at 24. Robertson posits as the moti vation lor couples' use of infertility
treatment, for example, the frustration of ''their normal species urge to
procreate." !d. at 98.
53
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CH I. L. R EV. 209. 2 10
( 1995). For another argument contesting the understanding of parenthood based
on genetic relatedness, see ELIZABETH BARTIIOLET, FAMlLY BONDS: A DOPTION
AND TilE POLITICS OF PA REN1'1NG ( J 993); R EPRODUCTI VE TECHNOLOGIES:
G ENDER, M OTHERHOOD AND MEDICINe (iV1ichelle Stanworth ed. , 1987).
54
ln custody disputes, courts typically discount the centrad mother's
genetic claim to legal matcmity and the unwed father's genetic claim to lega l
paternity in cases where the child's mother ss marrkd ta another m G~n. fn most
states, the sperm donor is not cousidered the legal fath~r of his genetic of!'!:!pring.
ss See Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice, Procreativf.! Liberty. and the
Limits ofLiberal Th eo;y: Robenson's Children of Choice, 20 L. & Soc. INQU IRY
1005, 1010-J 1 (1 995 )s6 See Radin, s11pra note 43, at 1932.
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particularly objectionable "since one could just as reasonably argue that
the physical and mental attributes that dri ve the market for models~
professional athletes, and computer scientists are also essential to •our
deepest understanding of what it i. to be human.' "57 Yet Robertson
himself rests his defense of paid pregnancy on the view that "procreative
liberty should enjoy presumptive primacy . . . because control over
whether one reproduces or not is central to personal identity, to dignity,
and to the meaning of one's life.''5 ~ Although Radin and Robertson
reach opposite conclusions about the implications of reproduction's
importance, they both ultimately rely on a similarly normative conception
of procreation.
Liberals' contention that their concept of procreation does not serve
to limit the reproductive choices of some indi viduals (as the feminist
social justice approach purportedly does) is also erroneous. Despite their
rhetoric, most liberals would probably concede that there must be some
limits to the use of reproductiOn-assisting technologies, even in the
absence of a showing of tangible harm to another individual. For
example, should procreative libeny pcnnit a parent to clone her offspring,
creating an exact genetiC replica of another human genome?· The only
way to restrict such pract1ces is to reson to some morali tic judgment
about the proper use of these technologies. Thus, Robertson posits "a core
view of the goals and values of reproduction" that encompasses only
"actions designed to enable a couple to have normal, healthy offspring
whom they intend to rear." 59 Robertson, therefore, opposes cloning and
the use of prenatal genetic screening to produce a disabled child.60
Procreative liberty does not protect these insidiou · forms of selection of
offspri ng characteristics, according to Robertson, because they '"pass
beyond the central experiences of identity and meaning that make
reproduction a valued experience." 61 But liberals' own argument from
their core understanding of reproduction rests on a fundamental moral
position about the proper role of reproduction.
l n sho11, liberals such as Rob;:rtson rely on conceptions of reproduction to outweigh indi vidua13' interest in personal choice that are no less
57

ROB ER"! SON, supra note l'S, at 142.
ss !d. at 24.
sn !d. at 167.
60
!d. at 17 1 (Robertson refers to the usc of genetic testing to produce a
disabled child as "intentional diminif:hment." As an example of intentional
diminishment, Robertson off:!rs a set of hypothdical dea f parents who wish to
usc genetic screening to t!nsure that their child will also be deaf. ).
IJI !d. at i 69.
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''moralistic" than feminist social justice approaches. Recognizing the
impossibility of avoiding these moral questions demolishes liberals'
repudiation of feminist criticism of unlimited procreative liberty on the
ground that it reflects a moral perspective.
B.

Liberal In equality

Moreover, liberals' exclusion of social justice concerns on the ground
that they constitute legal moralism does not promote government
neutrality as liberals claim. Liberals defend the bracketing of moral
arguments as a prerequisite for neutral government decisionmaking with
respect to individuals' personal choices. But liberalism in practice tends
to favor the choices of the privileged and to maintain current distributions
of wealth and power. This bias is reflected, for example, in liberals'
resolution of disputes between couples and birth mothers who have
entered into paid pregnancy contracts. \Vhen a birth mother decides she
does not wish to relinquish her child, both sides have procreative interests
at stake. But liberals insist on the enlistment of the gove1nment's
affirmative assistance in enforcing paid pregnancy contracts to protect the
wealthier and more powerful contracting man's interest in having a
genetically-related child. Thus, enforc ing these contracts would estabJish
in advance of any particular case the state's unequi vocal preference for
the reproductive interests of contracting men over contracted women.(i2
Further, courts in our existing liberal society are far more li kely to
recognize the rights of married couples to use reproduction-assisting
technologies to create or compl!!te nuclear famil ies than to uphold their
use by single heterosexual women, lesbians, or gay men."3 The dispropotiionate use of these technologies by whire people, despite higher
infertility rates among people of color, suggests as well the probability of
racial bi as in fertility and genetic counselling.64
See. e.g., Joan C. Callah;;m, Pmr.:reative Liherty: Whose Reprodt~ction ?
Whose Liberty ?, 6 STJ\1\'. L. & POL' Y REV. 121, 12 1-25 (1995).
63
See. e.g., MAtnH A 1\. f iELD, SURROC.iAT;-: MOTHERHOOD 116-21 ( 1988);
Joan C. Callahan, The Contract Morherhoorl Debate, 4 J. C UNlCAL ETHICS 82
( 1 993)~ Roberts, The Genetic Tie, ,\'upra note .53, at 252-57; Carol Smart "There
fs of Co11rse the Distinct foil Dictated by Nmure '': Law and the Problem of
61

Paternity, in R EPRODUCTIVE T EC H!\OLOG! ES : GE~DER, M OTHERHOOD AND
M EDICINE 98 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1. 987).
64
Patricia A. K ing1 The Past as Prologue: Race, Class and Gene Discriminatiofl , in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GU IDES 94, I 03 {George
J, Annas & Shennan Elias cds., 1992) (suggl!sting that the racial disparity in the
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The choices of the poor and people of color (and, particularly,
women in these groups), on the other hand, often remain unfulfilled or
even overridden under li beral notions of procreative liberty. Liberal
theory offers no support to people who cannot afford the cost of
reproductive health services. Nor does liberal theory necessarily recognize
as state intrusion conditions placed on government benefits to poor
women that restrict their reproductive decisions. Liberal theory leaves
market biases to operate freely against Jess powerful groups because these
forces do not constitute state interference with procreative choices. Thus,
in the case of abortion, li beral theory, with its noninterference interpretation of liberty, can (and does) allow the state to refuse to make abortion
services available to all women who need those services to safely exercise
their choice not to reproduce. The liberals' form al t!nderstanding of
political freedom as noninterference with seeking an abortion is a
virtually meaningless freedom for a woman who cannot afford to
purchase a safe procedure. In just this sort of way, liberal theory protects
the interests of the economically pnvileged while ignoring meaningful
freedom for the least well off.
C.

Harrn Revisited

Having established that liberals' core view of reproduction has no
presumptive advantage over one that takes into account social justice
concerns, we may turn again to tbe harms that are at the center of
femin ist concerns. A feminist social JUStice approach understands the
value of procreation and the ham1s stemming from reproduction-assisting
technologies in their social sunoundings. Such an approach recognizes
that it is impossible to comprehend the welfare of i n d i vidu al ~ apart from
the context of their social positions. This perspective contrasts markedly
with the liberal presumption that individl1als' procrt!ative choices may be
isolated from unjust social structuces. inJh iduals ore not atomistic beings
who create their identi ties, m ~ke choices, and detcnnine their interests
apart from their rspecitic communities .:~ nd general social locations. An
individual's ability to make. autonomous decisions is circumscribed by the
use of clinical genetic services may bt relat~d to physician referra ls); Laulie
Nsiah-Jefferson & Elaine l H<1ll. Reproduetive Technology: Perspectives and
implications /Dr Low-1ncorm: Women and Women of Color, in HEALING
TECHNOLOGY: FEMINiS l' ?FRSPECTIVES 9.3. 95-102, 109-ll (Kathryn S. Ratcli ff
et al. eds., 1989) (discussing baniers that re·,ttict access by poor women and
women of color to genetic c')tmselling and rtproduction-a~sisting technologies).
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material conditions of her life, including her social position and group
membership; her social location helps to determine her life prospects.
Membership in a dominant group affords an automatic privilege, while
membership in a subordinate group materially hatms people.l" The harm
of membership in a subordinate group is manifested in countless ways
and reflected in a myriad of statistics. The infelior social position of
women, generally, and black women, in particular, exemplify the harm
caused by unjust social strucntres.
Women experience more poveny and v1olence in their homes than
men because of their gender. A Jaber market and system of child care
structured against working mothers 1eads to increasingly high rates of
female poverty. 66 The proportion of poor white families maintained by
women rose from twenty percent in 19.59 to forty-two percent in 1987.67
Over one-half of black families head~d by women live in poverty; and
black families he3ded by women are three times as likely to be poor or
near poor than those with an adult male present. 6R Experts estimate that
half of all manied women will bl! beaten by their husbands at some point
in their mardage.69 Between fifteen and forty percent of all women are
victims of attempted or completed rap~s, most committed by acquaintances. 70 \Vho could reasonably Jeny that ihese are real, tangible harms?
Consider homosexual people as a subordinated group. Gay men and
lesbians are increasingly victims of hate crimes, perpetrated by straight
white men." lt is currently .: hought that thirty percent of gay male and
lesbian teenagers attempt suicide, with their sexual orientation a major

See Cheryl i. Harris, "?Vhiten~ss a.; P1operty, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707
(1993) (discussing the concept of whiten~ss as a form 1J f property that brings
with it benefits and privileges ratified by law).
~ 6 See generally MARTHA F INEMAN, THE NF.UTF.RC:O MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMI LY AND OTHER T WE:-IT!ETH CE:,ITURY TkN!E.DlES ( 1995).
67
Audrey Rowe, The Femimzallon of Pm·erty: An issue fm· the 90 's, 4
YALE J.L. & fEMINISM 73, 74 (199 1).
bS Margaret C. Simms, Black Women Who Head Families: An Economic
Stntggle, in SUPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS: TH!'2 STATUS OF BLACK WOtviEN
141 , 143 (Margaret C. Simms & Julwn!1c M. Malveaux eds .. 1986).
09
LENORE W,.'\LKER. TH E BAHERED WOMt'N 19 tl979); Martha R.
Mahoney, Legal/mages ofBartered rVomen: Redefining the Issue ofSeparation,
90 M ICH. L. RF.V. I (l99 I).
65

?tJ

CRIME VICTIMS R.ESEARCI I ,\liD rtU::\Ti\IENT

C1 R., RAPE IN Aiv!ERICA 3-5

(1992).
71

Kendall Thomas, Beyond tile i)rivacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 143 [,
1462 ( 1992).
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causal factor. 72 Who could reasonably deny that these are real, tangible
harms?
Blacks, too, continue to be victims of hate crimes; and despite
decades of civil rights struggle, blacks in Ameri ca still occupy a social
position drasti cally inferi or to that of whites. For example, blacks are
twice as likely to be unemployed and three times more likely to be poor
than whites. 73 Black infants, half of whom are born into poverty, die at
a rate twice that of whites, and overall life expectancy is significantly
lower for blacks than for whites.74 Who could reasonably deny that
these are real, tangible hanns?
This social positioning is buttressed by negative cultural images that
affect how others view and treat members of these groups, even
unconsciously. 75 Although we may not be able to predict the precise
harm a particular individual will suffer because of group membership, we
have more than ample evidence to show that all members of subordinated
groups are worse off than they would be if the group were not oppressed.
This is the result of subordination: the life prospects of the subordinated
never equal those of the privileged, dominant group.76 Since people in
these groups arc worse off than they would be without social dominance
and social subordinati on, even the Lockean must agree that they arc
harmed.
The claim that reproduction-asslSttng technologies contribute to the
subordinate status of oppressed groups is, then, a claim of tangible harm.
A feminist social justice approach recognizes that policies goveming
procreation not only afft!ct individual interests; they also shape the way
we value the members of social gro1JpS. Trading geneti c materi al and
women' s reproducti ve capacity on the market misvalues women' s
reproductive labor, exalts the importance of genetic relatedness, and

71

See, e.g., Chris Bull, Suicidal Tendencies: Is Anguish over Sexual
Orientation Causing Gay and Lesbian Tee11s to Kill Themselves?, ADVOCATE,
Apr. 5. I 994,

at

34-42.

73

David B. Swinton, The Economic Swtus of African Americans:
''Permanent " Poverty and fnequaii(V, in TI IF:. STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 25
( 199 1).

ivlortality Partems ~- United Stmes. !992 fi·om the Centers for Disense
Control and Prevention, 273 JAMA l 00 ( 1995).
15
See Charles R. Lawren~.:e, Ill, The ld, the Ego and Equal Protection:
Reckoni11g lVillz Uncons{ ious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rrv. 317 ( 1987) (demonstrating the prevalence of unconscious racism)
7
~ !d. at 326.
74
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devalues the genetic contribution of people of color. It therefore
reinforces gender, class, and racial inequality.
For these reasons, feminist 8ocial justice approaches call for the
inclusion of hrum s arising from unJuSt social relationships in deliberations
about the government's role in the development and use of reproductionassisting technologies. Feminists need not abandon, however1 the liberal
concern about government abuse of power and the danger to individual
autonomy posed by legislative maJorities. We may be willing to pennit
certain harms because attempting to prevent them would itself be
substanti ally more harmful. The degree of government intrusion into
individuals' procreative decis10ns requ1red tO regulate every use of
reproduction-assisting technologies may itself be too great a hann to
justi fy this regulation. Thus, as we pointed out earli er, a feminist social
justice approach need not support the absolute prohibition of noncoital
means of reproduction. But such an approach means to make clear that
inso far as these means of reproduction add to the privileging of men over
women, the privileging of white people over people of color, the
privileging of heterosexual people over homosexual people, the privileging of the economically well-off over the poor, and the commodification
of children, these means ru·e harmful and they should not be endorsed or
in any way supported by a government that purports to take the interests
of all its citizens equally seriously. Part of what this means is that no
public monies should be expended on the development of these technologies unless they are equally available to all citizens, and "contracts" for
so-called surrogate motherhood arrangements should not be enforceable.
lY.

CONCF-RNS ABOUT EXPLOfi !'\TlON AND YOLVi\jTARINESS

Liberals also challenge the fem inist contention that "contracts" for socalled surrogate motherhood arrangemems should not be enforced because
they are demeamng to •,vomen. Once again, Robertson serves as an
example when he argues that if a buth mother m one of these arrangemen ts wishes to keep the child, ''[p]n vilcgi ng the sunogate's wtshes over
the reliance wishes of the couple aSSL!rrtes Lhal women cannot make
rational decisiOns about reproduction and chi ld rearing pri or to conception.'117 Ruth Mackl in makes the same obJection. saymg that "[tjeminists
who oppose sunogacy presum~ to :.::peak for all women. But what they
are really saying is that those who ·lect to enter snrrogacy arrangements

n ROBI:!.RTSON,

supra

nole

8.

at

l32.
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are incompetent to choose and stand in need of protection. "711 Versions
of this argument have been put forward by liberal feminis ts as well, for
example, L01i Andrews, Barbara Berg, and Christine Sistare. 79
But this objection is just too quick. First, worries about exploitation
in contract pregnancy arrangements need not come from some particularly
feminist view. They may come from a certain view of the power
differentiations between races, ethnic groups, and classes that pays no
special attention to the position of women as such. Second, anyone who
opposes these arrangements need not hold that women entering into them
are incompetent to make such judgments for themselves and need not
hold that these women need special protection because of some special
vulnerability.
A.

Exploitation
It is often argued that contract pregnancies are likely to exploit poor

women, and particularly poor women of color. But it needs to be
remembered that m general, at least, it is acceptable to select public
policies that attempt to limit the activities of exploiters, even if fully
competent people might choose to be exploitees. That is; one may
coherently argue that the state's enforcement of these arrangements
contributes substantial ly to soc1etal altitudes toward \VOrnen and children
that simply ought not to be encO\.traged, in genentl, and ought not to be
encouraged by the state, in particular. Such an argument undetmines
Macklin's claims that ''lhe femin ist charge that the practice of sun·ogacy
exploits women is patemal i~. tic"8(J and '·the charge of exploitation
contradicts the moral stance that women have the ability and the right to
control their own bodies."H 1 After all, juiisd1ctions commonly refuse to
allow people to assent to being maimed or to engage in dueling, even
though people might make such assents voluntarily.

78

Ruth Macklin, Is l11ere rhzything Wrong with Surrogate lvfoth erltood? An
Ethical Analysis, in SURROGA TF. MOTH!.=RI-1000 : POLITI C~ 1\ND PRIVACY 136, l4 l
(Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
79
Andrews, supra note 38; Barbara J. Berg, Listening to the Voices of the
Infertile, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEM ll"!Sl PERSPEC'rJVES 80
(Joan C. Call::lhan cd., 1 9~5); Chrisdnt. T. Sis;:are. 8~:prodt,ctive i·~reedom and
Women 's Freedom: S11rrogacy (jnd Autonomy. 19 PlliL. F. 227 ( 1988).
Qo Macldin, s11pra note 78, at 1.41.
91 !d.
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Christine Overall makes one version of this feminist social justice
argument to Canadians with regard to commercial fonns of these
arrangements:
Merely mitigating the exploitive aspect of contract motherhood wh ile
making it legal begs the general question whether the practice as a
whole is justified, whether the Canadian state should be fostering the
work of women as breeders and whether this is a "job" for women that
Canadian society should endorse and support through state mechanisms.
The legalization of contract motherhood would present reproduction for
money as an acceptable, even desirable, aspect of women's place in
Canadian society. But this path is incompatible with the vision of
women as equal, autonomous, and valued members of this culture.82

Similarly, Joan Mahoney provides a non-patemalistic argument for
nonenforcement by showing the problems with the law's requiring
speci fie performance of terms goveming a woman's conduct during a
contract pregnancy and requiring relinquishment of a child after birth.83
Since liberals often argue for the enforcement of contract motherhood
arrangements on the ground of an analogy to sperm ''donation," Mahoney
distinguishes genetic and gestational mothers: she argues that women who
donate oocytes are analogous to spenn donors, but that these donors are
not analogous to women who carry pregnancies to term, and that the law
should not treat gestational mothers as analogous to gamete providers
who do not participate in gestation. 84 Refusing to enforce an agreement
to relinquish pru-cntal rights of a gestational mother, then, does not
constitute a worrisome kind of special treatment for women. Using
several precedents in labor law, Mahoney argues that precluding
gestational contract mothers from contracting away their parental rights
amounts to just one more provision among many that restrict the freedom
of employees. The fact that only women can become pregnant does nol
mean that such restrictions treat women as less competent and more in
need of protection from their dccistons than men.
At the same time, Mahoney argues that men and women are different
in some important ways, and that j ustice might well require recognizing

~z

Overall, :m pm note 9, at 13 I .
Joan Mahoney, An Essay on Surrogacy and Feminist Thought, in
SURROGATE TYIOTiiERHOOD: POLITICS ANO PRI VACY t83 (Larry Gostin cd. ,
1990).
" !d. at !88.
83
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some of these differences. That women alone can be and are gestational
mothers may make a difference that is appropriately recognized in law.85
Following feminist jurists such as Ruth Colker, Ann Scale , and
Catharine MacKinnon, Mahoney distinguishes what she calls the "antisubordination perspective'' from what she calls the "equality model"
found in liberal fem inist positions like Loti Andrews', which include the
worry that special treatment of women in these arrangements (i.e., by
nonenforcement) will only work against women. 86 The anti-subordination perspective that Mahoney takes asks whether the policy or practice
in question helps to maintain an underclass based on gender. If the law 's
refusal to recognize gestational mothers' prenatal contracts to relinquish
parental rights helps do away with the second-class status of women
generally, then feminists should support nonenforcement of these
contracts.
B.

Voluntariness

lt is sometimes argued by feminists that contract motherhood

arrangements should not be enforced because women cannot voluntari ly
decide before the binh of a child whether they wi ll be willing to give up
that child once it is born. Similar concems about voluntariness are often
heard in regard to other reproduction-assisting technologies. For example,
it has sometimes been argued that pronatalist attitudes exert a subtle but
extremely strong influence on women to reproduce, and women who have
access to these techno logtes are under enom10us pressure to seek them. 87
The pressure on women to become mothers is ·o great that some question

85

!d. at 190.
See id. a t 192: CATHARiNE A. MACKl:-11 0 , SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
W ORK ING WOMEN: A CASE or: SEX DISCRIMINATION ( 1979); Ruth Colker, AntiSubordination A bO\'e A II: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 6 I N. Y.U. L. REV.
1003 (1986 ); Ann C. Scales, The EmNgence of Feminist Juri~pntden ce: An
Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986).
87
See. e.g., GENA COR!:.A, THE :V!OTHER MI\CHI:-.!1:: REPRODUCTIVE
86

TECII NOLOGIES PROM 1\IUIFTCI:\L t NSEY!It ATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 166-85

( 1985 ); JuJith Lorber, Choice, Gift or Patriarchal Bargain ? Women's Consent
to In Vitro Fertilization in Male lnjimility , in FEM!f'IST PERSPECTI VES IN
169 t i iclen B. 11olmes & Laura M. Purdy eds., 1992).

M F.DlC'AL ET HICS

Pronatalism, of course, is not uni fom1 in society. Economically well-off white
women may be pressured by general pronatalist ani tudes to seek these technologies, but those general attitucks de) not extend to black women or poor women
of any racial 0r ethr.ic grotlp.
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whether the decision to use these technologies is a genuinely voluntary
choice. 88 Indeed, some views come close to holding that socially
constructed pronatalism is so strong that women, even under typical
conditions that do not require technol ogical assistance, cannot really
choose freely whether to take on motherhood. 9
It is important to address these concerns directly. On the one hand,
societal pronatalism for favored groups does result in enonnous pressure
on some women to reproduce. There is no question about this. Our
society does not think it is just fine for people to remain single and
childless deliberately or for married people to remain childless deliberately. Infertility is constructed as a nearly unbearable tragedy; deliberate
childlessness is constructed as nearly uni maginable selfishness. 90 Under
such conditions, what might be said on the question of voluntruiness in
seeking reproductive assistance?
It needs first to be noted that voluntariness is not an all-or-nothing
matter~ voluntariness is a characteristic of human activity which admits
of degrees. Further, questions about the voluntariness of an individual's
action are necessarily contextual. For exam ple, the criteria for making an
acceptably voluntary purchase of an automobile are very di fferent from
the criteria for giving an acceptably voluntary consent to a major surgery.
So, highly general discussions of voluntariness will always be limited in
their usefulness, much as highly general discussions of causality are
always limited in their usefulness. For example, Joel Feinberg argues that
the
point of a causal citation is to single out one of the certified causal
candidates that is especially interesting to us, given our various practical
purposes and cognitive conc.:?ms.... Explanatory citations ingle out.
abnonnal interferences with the non·nal course of events or hitherto
unknown missing links in a person's understanding. They arc designed

88

See, e.g. , Lorber, supra note 87.
See. e.g. , Martha E. Gimenez, Feminism. Pronawlism, all{/ Motherhood,
in MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN fEM INIST THEORY 287, 293 (Joyce Trebil cot e d.,
9
R

1984).
90

Of course, and m; we have memi(med pn::v iously, we do not see
proponents of reproductive liberty wonying about the infertility of those who are
not white and/or who arc poor. And many of those for whom the society does
not have pronatalist ambitions, particulariy blacks, are in P most peculiar position
- the dominant white society is not invested in the reproduction of blacks, but
a ma!Tied black couple deliberately childless is even more unthinkable an
instance of selfishness.
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simply to remove puzzlement by citing the causal factor that can shed
the most light. Hence we can refer to the criterion of selection in
explanatory contexts (for short) as the !aJitern criterion. Causal citations
made from the "engineering standpoint'' are made with a view to
facilitating control over future events by citing the most effi ciently and
economically manipulable causal factor. The criterion for selection
[here] . .. can thus be called (for sho11) the handle criterion. The point
of causal citations in purely blaming contexts is simply to pin the label
of blame on the appropriate factor for further notice and practical use.
These judgments cite a causal factor that is a human act or omission
"stained'' (as an ancient figure of speech would have it) with fau lt. The
criterion [here] ... can be called (for short) the srain criterion. When
we look for 'the cause," then, we may be looking for the causal factor
that has either a lantern, a handle or a stain on it. 91

There is, then, no such thing as "the cause" which can be cited in any
case independent of purpose and context. ln much the same way, there
is no such thing as a completely free action. Indeed, any action that was
completely free or unint1.uenced would be completely random, and this
is surely not what we mean by voluntary human action. Analogous to
making an appropriate causal Citation, whether an action is to be
considered appropriately or acceptably voluntary will necessarily be a
function of our purposes and the context of the action.
Suppose our purpose tn askmg about the voluntanness of a woman's
choice in seeking reproduction asSIStance 1s to dec1de whether she ought
to be prevented from obtaining assistance. When we are talking about
voluntariness from the perspecti ve of potential interference, we need to
ask what is at stake and whether someone has v1able alternatives.
Pronatalist attitudes certainly do put pressure on women to seek assistance
in reproducing; but the pressure here is not analogous to compulsion
(e.g., being swept up and carried oft) or coercion (e.g., being forced at
gunpoint). In cases of genuine com pulsion or coercion, it would be
completely unreasonable lo expect someone to resist, ~ither because she
is being overpowered physically or because the threat to her is so
substantial. 92 rn these cases, it makes sense to say that someone is
completely a v1ctim -that she had no real choice but to "act'' as she did.
[f our questi on is whether women ~houl d be precluded from seeking

91
92
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See Joan C. Callahan. Paternalism and Volrmtarin ess, 16
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reproduction assistance because their choice to do so is unfree in a
pronatalist society like our own, the answer has to be no; such interference would not be justified on the basis of women's choices being unfree
to the relevant degree m the relevant sense.
On the other hand, if our purpose in asking about the voluntariness
of women's seeking reproductton assistance is to determine whether there
are worrisome influences at work that need to be noticed and addressed,
it is reasonable to conclude that pronatalist social attitudes do exert a
troubling, often insidious, mfluence on women's choices to reproduce in
general, and to seek potentially pamful, nsky, and expensive reproduction
assistance in particular. Feinberg, for example, argues:
[A) person's consent is ful ly voluntary only when he is a competent and
unimpaired adult who has not been tr..reaten~d. misled, or lied to about
relevant facts, nor manipulated by subtle forms of conditioning. It is
worth giving emphasis here to two points: that both force and fraud can
invalidate consent, and that "force" can be very subtle indeed. 9J

Feinberg's use of ''scare quotes," of course, is to alert us that "force''
regarding human action is being used here in a way other than its usual
way. The meaning of "force" in this context is not analogous to
"compulsion" or "coercion," but is more like the meaning of ·'force" in
science, where forces are understood to have greater and lesser power.
The point (for our discussion) is that '"'e all grow up in a society that
subj ects us to various subtle fonn s of conditioning, and, depending on the
force or influence of that conditionil~g on our actions, the voluntariness
of our choices can be impaired.
When feminists question 'NOmen's voluntaiiness in electing reproduction assistance, part of the intent is to direct actention to these subtle
fonns of conditioning and to point out that they do raise legitimate
concerns about the n~asons women might have tor being so intent on
reproducing. One way to put th1s pomt 1s to say that if we did not live in
a society which put such celentless pressure on (at least some) women to
reproduce, we could have complece confidence that a woman's reproductive choices wt:re not the result of manipulation by conditioning, subtle
and often not-so-subtle.
Feminists are also often concemt~d d1at women might be misled
regarding the safety and efficaci ( 1f some reproduction-assisting
technologies. There ace dangers associated with these r~chnolog ies that

03
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often go unmentioned. For example, a number of these technologies
involve inducing superovulation, which involves giving high doses of
fertility drugs to perfectly healthy, fertile, fu lly functional women who
are "donating" eggs for others' use or whose male panners are subfertile.
The long-term effects of superovulati on are not known; and egg
collection has led to several deaths and a number of injuries with
potential for causing pennanent infertility. There is a grim irony in the
use of procedures that risk the fe1iili ty of a healthy woman to assure
reproduction for an 1nferti le or subfertile man or an infertile woman.
It is also the case that the more elaborate and more expensive forms
of these technologies frequently fa il, and reporting systems have not
required clear reports of failure rates. Robyn Rowland, for example,
suggests that the most honest and helpful repo11ing would include fai lure
rates instead of so-called success rates. 94 She discusses a survey of IVF
clinics in America:
Many clinics were quoting a :?.0 per cent success rate, using what they
saw as the worldwide average; yet of the fifty-four clinics which
responded to the questionnaire, halfhad never sent a client home with
a baby. . . . Statistics were manipulated, so that some of the so-called
pregnancies were in fact just chemical changes which might or might
not have been an early sign of pregnancy. Hospitals would cite
pregnancies as a success rate, as opposed to live births, and many
hospitals counted their twms and tnplets 111 the reported totals of live
births. Ectopic pregnanc1e:i were also rated in rhc 'success'' category.
Most clinics usc pregnancy rates because these are much higher tha n the
Jive birth rates due to the high rates of ectopic pregnancies, stillbirths
and spontaneous abqrtions.~s

One set of recent fi gures shows that of 19,079 treatment cycles, 16,405
(eighty-six percent) involved successful egg retrievals, 14, 150 (seventyfour percent) involved successful transfers leading to 3057 (sixteen
percent) pregnancies, which culminated in 2345 (twelve percent)
deliveries. 96 Of these delivelies, 673 (twenty-eight percent) were multi94

R OIWN ROWLAND, LIVI.'ICi LABORATORiES: WOMI::.N AND REPRODUCTIVE

TECHNOLOGI ES

44 ( 1992).
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John F. Randolph. Jr. (DireCLOi' of the Division of Reproductive

Endocrinology, Departm:!nt or Obstetrics and Gynecology, University of
Michigan Medical Center), l'~Jcl!c lcctt.JJe Gponsored by the GTE foundation
Lectureship ProgrJm in Tt::i.:hl1\)logy 3nJ Ethics at Transylvania Uni\crsity (Apr.
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pie gestations.97 If each of these multiple births involved only twins
(which they did not), that would mean that ar most 1346 treatment cycles
of 19,079 (seven percent) could be counted as successful. 9H On
Rowland's suggestion for giving figures, that's a ninety-three percent
failure rate. The statistics for GIFT and ZIFT are even worse.99 Rowland
puts it baldly: "[J]n any other technological area [this) wou ld be
considered a gross failure and immediately discontmued." 100
Add to this that roughly thirty-five percent of couples "diagnosed" as
infertile ultimately succeed in achieving pregnancy with no treatment, 101
and the wisdom of applying these technologies becomes highly questionable, at best. Yet, desptte the discomforts, nsks, financial costs, and
dismal success rates of these programs, women who have the financial
means to afford them continue to enroll in them. 102 If enrolling women
do not understand the failure rates of these programs, their participation
in them is not acceptably voluntary. On the other hand, if women do
understand the high failure rates of these programs, yet they continue to
take on the discomfort, risk, and expense of them, Lhis raises pertinent
questi ons about their desperation for children genetically connected to
them and/or their male partners as well as questions about the source of
that desperation. We do not want to suggest that women entering these
programs are so desperate that their choices ro do so are so involuntary
that they should not be permitted to make these choices, but we do want
to suggest that when a woman is so "desperate" to have a child genetically related to her and/or her partner that she seeks special reproductionass isting services that are painful, often humiliating, 103 risky, tremendo u~ ly expensive, and, at the same time, highly unlikely to yield the child

29, 1993).
91 Jd.
9H Jd.
qq !d.
100

supra note 94. at 48.
See, e.g., John A. Col ti ns et al., Treawumt-independcnr Pregnancy Among
ft((ercile Couples, 309 NF.\v ENG. 1. MED. 120 1, UG2 (1983 ).
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De eloperE; and provtders of these technologies continue to utilize public
funds (in the fonn of research suppon and the utilization of public fac ilities, such
as state universities) and to press for privat~ insurance can·iers to cover their
costs. At the same time, and not surprisingly. none of these proponents press for
Medicaid or Medicare funding for applying thcsl) technologies to those without
the ability w pay for them.
103
See, for example, Rowt AND, s11pra note 9-l, at 29-30. who includes
testimony from women who have participated in these programs.
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she seeks, she is acting on a motive that is socially constructed and that
may well compromise the voluntariness of her choice.
Many feminists have argued that the so-called desperation of the
infertile is a social construction.10"1 Indeed, it is a social construction
twice over. First, women's experience of desperation in wanting a
"genetically appropriate" child is largely the result of social attitudes
toward infertility. Second, even if an inferti le woman does not experience
desperation for a "genetically appropriate" child, she is constructed as
desperate and as someone who should be willing to do all that she can to
produce such a child. As Naomi Pfeffer says, "What is required of the
infertile is that they submit in silence to the claim that they are desperate."105 The groundwork for such a requirement is clearly laid in liberal
discussions of the value of genetic reproduction, such as John Robertson's, which assume without argument a fundam ental connection between
reproduction of one's genes and one's self-identity. 106 But this is not a
claim likely to be made by a woman; and it is a claim quite likely to be
rejected by a feminist. Indeed, feminists have often argued that the
emphasis on genetic connections is intimately tied to patriarchy, both
historically and contemporarily, 107 particularly in its racist manifestation. 108 Women may well be deeply mvested in experiencing pregnancy,
childbirth, nursing, and parenting ~- ~xperiences that accompany ordinary
reproduction in the ordincu·y way ·- but this is emphatically not equivalent
to being deeply invested in h~ving a child genetically related to them
and/or their male spouses. The whole cm!)hasJs on genetically-related
children that inforrns Robertson·s view, then, is found by social justice
femini sts to be suspecr as a pr:rspective that 1s characteristic of women;
and if it is not characteristic of women, this is just one more occasion on

10

See, e.g., Naomi Pfeffer, ,{rtifi.::ial Insemination, ln-vitrn F'errilization and
the Stigma ofli?(ertili(v, ill R.EPf<ODUCT!VE TECliNOLOntES: GFNDER, MOTHERHOOD AND M EDICINE 8 I (Mkh.:.llc St3.11\'.'\Jrlh .ed., l ~87).
lOS fc/. at 9} .
106
ROB£R"J"$0,'1, supra 110 ( t' :l.
107
See, e.g., id. at 2'1, 98; BA.IUJARA K. f<.OTHM.Al'l, RECREATING NiOTHER£

HOOD: IDEOLOOY AND TECllNOLOCi'/ 1111 A PA"I'i~:A ttCHAL SOC!i:.TY ( 1 939)~

Joan

Mahoney, Adoption as a Femim.:r .-J.Itel",wtive to Reproductive Technology, in
REPRODUCflON. ETH !CS, .A J'iD l~lr; L 1\W: t:Er;Jli'.TST PERSPECTl"ES 35 (Joan C.
Callahan .;d., 1995); Pat-t icia Si"i"li1h, Selfish G;!r!.!,\ t.md lvfmemal 1'/fyrhs: A Look
at Postmt:!I:OJXWsal Pregna11cy, in \ 1J:.i-IO?AUSE : .0.. l'..1 1DLJ ;:E ?ASSAGE 92 (Joan
C. Callahan td., 1993).
10

$

See Rob•~!ts , Th.! Gq;u:.:"c Ti~ . sup."'

11-..tc

53.

1995 -96]

A fEMJl\IST SOCIAL JUSTICE APPROACII

1231

which liberalism has left out the perspective of women taking the
perspective of men as the norm .
ln sum, then, a feminist social justice approach is an antisubordination perspective that is no more a forn1 of legal moralism than is
liberalism, and a proponent of this perspective can argue against the
deployment of reproduction-assisting technologies and against the state's
enforcing contract motherhood arrangements without assuming that
women are incompetent or in need of special protection simply because
they are women. At the same time, (selecttve) pronatalism in a society
can and does put women under considerable, if often subtle, pressure to
produce children genetically related to themselves and/or their male
pattners. Although this does not render women incompetent to decide
whether to use these technologies, it does raise important questions about
possible compromises of voluntanness on the part of women who seek
these technologies, particularly those technologies that are painful, risky,
very expensive, and hi ghly prone to failure.
CONCLUSION: THE STATE 1 S PROPER ROLE fN
PROTECTING AND EN HANCfNO PROCREATIVE L IDERTY

The liberal notion of procreative liberty encompasses only the right
against state interference with personal decisions abou t reproduction. As

we have mentioned, this view follows the prevailing jurispntdence that
the Constitution protects only an individual's "negative" right to be free
from unjustified intrusion, rather than the ··positi ve'' right actually to lead
a free life. 109 Consistent with its predominant concem with government
neutrality, liberal theory docs not recognize an afftrmati ve entitlement to
the resources needed to procreate. A· Robertson explains, procreative
libeny "means that a person v i o l ate~ no moral duty in making a
procreative choice, and that other persons have a duty not to interfere
with that choice"' but "does not imply the duty of others to provide the
resources or services necessary tc, ~xercise one's procreative liberty
despite plausible moral arguments for govenunent assistance. nii O Thus,
101
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the definition of procreative liberty as a purely negative right exempts the
state from any obligation to ensure the social conditions and resources
necessary for autonomous decisiomnaking about reproduction. 111
The Supreme Court elaborated the distinction between the negative
and positive protection of reproductive rights in a series of cases
concerning the government's obligation to subsidize the poor woman 's
right to an abortion. 112 In these cases, the Court refused to require the
state or federal government to pay for the cost of abortion services for
poor women, even though it pays for the expenses incident to childbirth.
The Harris Court reasoned: ''[l]t simply does not follow that a woman 's
freedom of choice canies with it a constitutional entitlement to the
financial resources to avai l herself of the full range of protected
choices .. . . (A)lthough govenm1ent may not place obstacles in the path
of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those
not of its own creation.'' 11 3
Feminist legal scholars have pointed to the abortion-funding cases as
a prime example of the limits of constitutional privacy doctrine. 114 They
note that framing the abortion right as a right merely to be shielded from
state intrusion into private choices provides no basis for a constitutional
claim to public suppoti for abortions. Catharine MacKtnnon, for example,
concludes that abortion as a pnvate privilege serves to perpetuate gender
inequality because 1t fai ls to recogmze the ways in which social forces
constrain women's reproductive decisiOns: '~The point is that [women's]
altematives are precluded p rior to the reach of the chosen legal doctrine.
They are precluded by conditions of sex, race, and class - the very
conditions the privacy frame not only leaves tacit but exists to g uarantee.''1 15 Like the liberal v1ew of hann and volunta1iness, the liberal view
of the state's role ignores the role that social position plays in detennining individuals' reproductive choices.
A feminist social justice critique of the negati ve interpretation of
liberty demonstrates a serious flaw in liberal theorizing about rights. But
we need not abandon the liberal model of rights and adopt a positive
notion of liberty to minim ize the government's facilitabon of reprod uc~
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tion-assisting technologies. The prohibition of unjustified state interference with liberty does not prevent the state from refusi ng to support
reproduction-assisting technologies. Even the negative view of liberty
leaves the state free to decide not to lend affirmative assistance to
individuals who choose to use these technologies.
According to the liberal noninterference model, the state is not
required to support individuals' use of these technologies in any way.
Liberals who argue that the state must facilitate the use of these
technologies, by enforcing paid pregnancy contracts for instance, are thus
caught in a serious internal mcons1stency. Although fa iling to enforce
these contracts may discourage couples from entering into these
arrangements, liberal theory does not require the state to promote
procreative arrangements in this way. As we noted above, enforcing these
contracts pri vileges the procreative interests of more powerful men over
the procreative interests of poore:r gestational mothers. Liberals seem
willing to depart from the noninterference model only for the sake of the
most ptivileged members of society. But this, of course is patently
unfair.
A feminist sociaJjustice approach not only highlights this inconsistency in the liberal position but also supports state refusal to encourage the
development and deployment of reproduction-ass isting techno logies. ·
These technologies' contribution to the subordinati on of women, poor
people, and people of color justifies the government's decision to refrain
from facilitating them. The state shoul.d not lend its affim1ative support
to practices that demean members of society and deepen already existing
social inequities. Under this view, the state should refuse to enforce paid
pregnancy contracts because they commodify children, degrade all
women's reproductive labor, and. particularly, devalue women and
children of color. Indeed, the state could refuse to spend any public
resources for the development or deployment of reproduction-assisting
technologies on the basis of their harmful effects. The government's total
departure from this field, on the other hand, like the total prohibition or
non-coital means of procreation, may also be substantively harmful.
Rather than lead to a ban of public spending on reproduction-assisting
techno logies, a femin ist social justice approach might call for public
funding strategies designed to reduce the concentration of the use of these
techno logies among the most nftluent, theieby addrcs:> ing the problem of
privilege anJ subordination.
How i the feminist arguntent that the state should not support
reproduction-assisting technologies ai;.y different from the liberal
argumenr that the state need nol support women's access to abortion
services? The difference iies in femin ist'·' attention to social power. A
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feminist social justice approach rejects certain state facilitation of these
tcchnologie because of their contribution to an unjust social structure.
Thus, a feminist social ju tice approach takes more seriously the moral
equality of persons than does liberalism, since liberalism leaves this
structure intact, and uses methods that continue to sustain it. A feminist
social justice approach also calls for state assistance of women's right to
an abortion because the abortion right is essential to eliminating women's
social subordination and to ensuring that a woman's choice not to be a
parent can always be realized. Both these positions are consistent with a
predominant concern fo r dismantling unjust arrangements of race, class,
and gender power and both are consistent with ensuring substantive
liberty lor all in our society , not j ust for those in privileged groups.
Unlike the liberal view of liberty, the feminist social justice approach
does not hinge on the fal se dichotomy between state interference and
noninterferen ce. 1 16 Rather, it seeks to achieve a society free of invidious
hierarchies that materially impair certain individuals' reproductive
autonomy.
An examination of contemporary reproduction-assisting technologies,
then, shows that a femi niRt social j ustice approach is superior to
liberalism on the two axiological axes that undergird liberal theory itself.
That is, a feminist social JUStice approach is better able than liberalism to
serve as a .socJal and political theory on which to base a poli tical society
lhat takes the liberty and moral equality of all its citizens equally
seriously.

For femin ist critiques on the fal s~ dichotomy between state interference
and nonintt:rferencc, see Jenn ifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources.
Tf1011gll rs and P f)SSibilities, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 18 ( 1989) (noting that
the market " is not a freestanding, narural phenomenon, but consists of rules
defined by law and backed by the power of the state"); Frances E. Olsen, The
Fami(l' onrl tht! lvlark.ec: ..-1 Srucly of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 H ARV. L.
R EV. 1 -~97 ( 1983 ); Frances E. Olsen, The lvfy rh of Stare intervention in the
Fwni!y. I~ U. MlClt .T.L. RH. 835 ( 1985).
116

